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ON COMPUTER CRIME

(SENATE BILL S. 240)
by John K. Taber*

INTRODUCTION

Now pending before Congress is Senate Bill S. 240,1 introduced
by Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D. Conn.) on January 25, 1979, and
entitled "Federal Computer Systems Protection Act 2of 1979." This
bill attempts to define and outlaw "computer" crimes.
S.240 consists of a preamble and three sections. The preamble
asserts that computer crime is a growing, serious problem that is
difficult to prosecute under existing laws, thus necessitating new
federal legislation. Section (a) of the bill outlaws any use of a computer for fraudulent purposes. Section (b) outlaws "intentional, unauthorized" use, access, or alterations of a computer, computer
programs or data. Section (c) contains definitions of various terms
used in the bill.
The legislation covers all government computers, any computers
used by private entities with government contracts, computers used
in banking and finance, as well as all computers used by "any entity
* B.A. 1974, University of California, Berkeley; Systems Programmer, International Business Machines Corporation since 1970. Mr. Taber has worked on the development of APL (A Programming Language), and is currently working on the
development of large data bases.
The author is very grateful to John S. James, Dr. Harry Saal, and Lawrence M.
Breed, for their critical review of this article and their many helpful suggestions for

improvement. The views expressed by the author are entirely his own and should
not be construed as reflecting the views of any organization, or any other person. Errors also are entirely his own.
1. The text of S. 240 is reprinted in the Appendix to this article.
2. A virtually identical bill, S. 1766, was introduced by Senator Ribicoff in the
Ninety-fifth Congress (123 CONG. Rsc. 10,790 (daily ed. June 27, 1977)), but failed to be

reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judicary before the end of the second
session. See Federal Computer Systems ProtectionAct (S. 1766), Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures,Comm. of the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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operating in or affecting interstate commerce."'3 The penalties for a
violation of section (a) are fifteen years imprisonment and/or a fine
of two and one-half times the amount stolen. For a violation of section (b), the penalties are fifteen years imprisonment or a $50,000
fine, or both.
The purpose of this article is to point out the fatal flaws that
should preclude this bill from ever becoming law, and suggest that
there is no such thing as a "computer" crime, and therefore no need
for special legislation addressing this "problem."
I.

COMPUTER CRIME: FACTS AND MYMS

The rationale for this legislation, as presented in the bill's preamble, 4 has never been established. There is no evidence that computer-based fraud and embezzlement are increasing. In fact, losses
from computer-related crimes are insignificant when compared with
criminal losses in general, 5 and losses from so-called "white collar"
6
crimes in particular.
While almost everyone is aware of the sensational accounts of
"computer crimes" contained in the mass media, these stories are,
simply put, either grossly exaggerated or just plain wrong. For example, newspapers widely reported that the Security Pacific Bank
theft in Los Angeles, California, was a "computer" crime;7 it was
not.8 The Pennsylvania Railroad boxcar thefts were also reported as
3. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1979).
4. The Congress finds that(1)
computer-related crime is a growing problem in the Government
and in the private sector;
(2) such crime occurs at great cost to the public since losses for each
incident of computer crime tend to be far greater than the losses associated
with each incident of other white collar crime;
(3) the opportunities for computer-related crimes in Federal programs,
in financial institutions, and in other entities which operate in interstate commerce through the introduction of fraudulent records into a computer system, unauthorized use of computer facilities, alteration oi destruction of
computerized information files, and stealing of financial instruments, data, or
other assets, are great;
(4) computer-related crime directed at institutions operating in interstate commerce has a direct effect on interstate commerce; and
(5) the prosecution of persons engaged in computer-related crime is difficult under current Federal criminal statutes.

Id. § 2.
5. These losses are estimated at $90 billion annually. Hearings, supra note 2, at
118 (statement of E. J. Criscuoli, Jr.).
6. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Computer Experts Accused of Theft of $10.2 Million to Buy
Diamonds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
8. The Security Pacific Bank theft did not involve computers. The culprit, Stanley Mark Rifkin, obtained the bank's password by observing the teletype operators in
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a "computer" crime;9 again, they were not. 10 The Equity Funding
fraud," one of the largest frauds ever committed, was also cited as a
"computer" crime; 12 this claim has been much disputed. 13
From information supplied by many federal government investigative agencies, the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") has reported a total of sixty-nine cases of "computer" crime in the entire
federal government.' 4 Actually, there were only sixty-six reported
cases, since the Air Force erroneously identified three cases as computer crimes that did not even involve computers. 5 Nine of these
cases involved no dollar loss, being incidents such as privacy invasion.16 The total reported losses were $2,161,413; 17 the average loss
was $44,000, and the median loss was $6,749.18
the transfer cage-a place to which he should not have been given access. He then
telephoned the bank and, by impersonating a bank officer and supplying the correct
password, was able to transfer funds from the Security Pacific Bank to a bank in New
York. Amusingly enough, Rifkin used the wrong Security Pacific Bank number on his
first attempt; he then obtained the correct account number from bank officials and repeated the phone call, this time successfully. Oddly, Donn Parker classifies this case
as "computer abuse," because the transfer cage was located in the computer room.
Personal communication between John K. Taber and Donn B. Parker.
9. Hearings,supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.); id. at 18
(statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy).
10. The boxcar thefts resulted solely from the manipulation of manual records.
Personal communications between John K. Taber and Donn B. Parker.
11. See generally D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 118-74 (1976); R. SOBLE & R.
DALLos, THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM. THE EQUITY FUNDING STORY: THE FRAUD OF THE
CENTURY (1975).
12. Hearings,supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.); id. at 18
(statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy); id. at 28 (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy
Ass't Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Dep't of Justice).
13. R. LOEFFLER, REPORT OF THE TRUSTEE OF EQUITY FUNDING CORP. OF AMERICA,
Oct. 31, 1974. See also Hearings,supra note 2, at 57 (statement of Donn B. Parker).
14. GAO REPORT, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, PROBLEMS
ASSOCIATED wITH COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND PRIVATE INDUS-

TRY, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-91 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].

15. The correction to the GAO REPORT is from a statement by Joseph P. Welsch,
Deputy Ass't Sec. of Defense for Management Sys. (Dec. 3, 1976), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, STAFF STUDY OF COMPUTER SECURITY IN FEDERAL

PROGRAMS, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 149 (1977) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER SECUrIY
STUDY]. He also mentions that one Army case out of the sixteen involved conflict of
interest on the part of computer management personnel rather than computer crime.
Id. It is not clear, however, whether this case was included in the GAO study or not.
Presumably, it was.
16. GAO REPORT, supra note 14, at 91, note c to table.
17. Id. at 91.
18. While the GAO REPORT did not supply the median, it is a simple matter to
compute it from the tables. Id. at 90-91. Because of the distribution of data, the median is mathematically more meaningful than the average.
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In a study19 conducted by the Stanford Research Institute
("SRI"), based largely upon newspaper articles, the dollar loss for
197520 was given as $1.45 million. 2 1 This figure included the private
sector as well as local and federal government. 22 The total accumu23
lated loss for the past fifteen years has been given as $280 million;
24
with an average loss of $450,000 per case.
Estimated annual losses, made by SRI and others, vary widely:
$100 million, 25 $300 million, 26 and $160 million by 1985.27 In contrast,
the estimated losses from white collar crime in 1974 alone was $40
28
billion.
These "computer crime" loss figures are very questionable.
There is something particularly suspect about the average loss
figure of $450,000, which is more than ten times the GAO average. It
is probable that the difference is due to the fact that the SRI study
was based upon the amount quoted in newspaper articles. Also, the
actual losses for 1975 of $1.45 million is inconsistent with the claimed
losses of $280 million over a fifteen year period-an amount two
hundred times as great. This enormous discrepancy implies that
computer crime is rapidly vanishing, or that the years 1976-1978 were
incredibly lucrative years for computer criminals, or that 1975 was
abnormally bad for these same persons.
SRI attributes this discrepancy to a time lag between the occurrence of a crime and its reporting.29 This is a valid point, but not
sufficient to explain the enormity of the discrepancy. 30 From the appearance of SRI's loss graph, 31 allowing for a time lag, and averaging
the losses over the years, a reasonable loss for 1975 should be in the
19. D. PARKER, COMPUTER ABUSE ASSESSMENT (Stanford Res. Inst. Rep. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENT].
20. This is the most recent year for which complete figures are available.
21. ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 14 (Fig. 2).
22. Id.
23. Hearings,supra note 2, at 57 (statement of Donn B. Parker).
24. Id. at 18.

25. U.S.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A HANDBOOK

ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 4-6

(1974).
26. Computer Capers, TIME, Aug. 8, 1977, at 53. This figure was probably derived
from PARKER, supra note 11, at 29-30. This figure is based upon the unjustified assumptions that one hundred cases will be reported each year, and that these reported
cases constitute fifteen per cent of all computer-related crimes per year with an average loss of $450,000 per case. Id.

27.

INSTrrUTE FOR THE FUTURE, THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC LOSSES ARISING FROM

COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS IN THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS

28.
29.
30.
31.

(1972).

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 25, at 5-9.
Assessment, supra note 19, at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12.
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range of six to fifteen million dollars. But the loss curve is not well
behaved; losses by years are fat or lean, and for 1976 through mid1978, fantastic. The following table transcribes SRI's graph and
shows yearly accumulated losses with yearly accumulated averages.
YEARLY LOSSES
YEARS

YEAR

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
15.5

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Loss

2.0
5.1
0.176
0.0003
0.001
4.47
2.002
11.6
7.82
14.64
8.74
6.21
1.45
not available
not available
mid-1978

32

ACCUMULATED
Loss

2.0
7.1
7.276
7.2763
7.2773
11.7473
13.7493
25.3493
33.1693
47.8093
56.5493
62.7593
64.2093
not available
not available
280.0

ACCUMULATED
AVERAGE

2.0
3.55
2.425
1.819
1.455
1.9579
1.964
3.1687
3.685
4.7809
5.1408
5.2299
4.939

18.0645

A time lag cannot explain the minuscule loss of $300 in 1966.
Nor can it explain the jump from a $64 million accumulated loss in
1975 to $280 million in mid-1978, just 2 1/2 years later. In plain English, these figures are too queer to be real! Far from being frightened by them as the proponents of S. 240 seem to be, one should
question the data upon which these figures are based. SRI's data is
unreliable and replete with unknown biases, as SRI is careful to
33
point out.
The author has personally examined more than seventy of SRI's
"raw" cases-Cases 7711-74802, inclusive-the latest acquired by SRI
at that time. These cases are not included in SRI's published totals,
except perhaps in the mid-1978 figure of $280 million, but they do not
differ in quality from cases described in the published reports. With
few exceptions, the data available are newspaper clippings, mostly
provided by clipping services. The obvious biases that appear in
these cases include:
-the reporting of crimes that do not involve computers. These in32. Id. from figure at 14. Losses are given in millions of dollars.
33. Assessment supra note 19, at 10 & 18. PARKER, supra note 11, at 25: " . . public media are the predominant source ... Newspaper accounts ... are treated with
particular skepticism." Unfortunately, skepticism or not, these newspaper cases are
not excluded and account for many of SRI's cases and loss figures.
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clude Fednet frauds, bank embezzlements, automatic teller
machine frauds, and credit card frauds. The Stanley Mark Rifkin
case, 34 by the way, was a Fednet fraud and the second such case
to be misrepresented as a computer crime. The first one involved
a different branch of the same bank and a Bausch and Lomb ac35
count in Illinois.
-- the reporting of crimes that are simply record manipulations,
such as false invoices, false payments, and false billings. In these
cases, while the records and office procedures are computerized,
the computer is not manipulated to carry out the crime. For example, a stock broker employee, devoid of all technology, gives a
data entry clerk a false margin for an account, and then borrows
36
fraudulently against that account.
-the reporting of crimes only if they are in some sense "newsworthy." In practice, this means that the amount of loss is extraordinary. The typical crime, the small crime, is simply never
37
reported.
-- gross exaggerations of the amount lost, and distortions of the
facts of the case, literally beyond recognition. In one case at
Ames Research Center (SRI Case 77409), two "computer experts"
were reported to have stolen time on the ILLIAC valued at "billions," based on an estimated rate of $100 a millisecond for ILLIAC time. 3 8 This story caused much mirth among computer
34. See note 8 supra.
35. SRI Case 78308. See Ex-Controller Admits Guilt in $140,000 Fedwire Theft,
Computerworld, Aug. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 3. See also Fed Moves to Tighten Security of
Net As PotentialforTransfer Loss Rises, Am. Banker, May 25, 1978, at 1, col. 2. There
may have been other, earlier cases that were not tagged "computer crimes" by the
media.
36. SRI Case 77331. See Delsohn, Tooley Hits Slap-on-the-Wrist Sentence, Rocky
Mtn. News, July 20, 1978; Seldner, Brokerage Embezzler Receives Suspended
Sentences, Denver Post, July 20, 1978. See also Criminal Action No. 122398, City and
County of Denver, State of Colorado, Arrest Warrant and Supporting Affidavit, which
details the crime.
The first two purchases of Loren Industries stock in the Robert Miller account were fraudulently switched to a "margin" account by altering the last
two digits in the account number on the customer buy form. For all
purchases of this stock thereafter, fraudulent transfer from a "cash" account
to a "margin" account was accomplished by some person with access to the
corporate records, making adjustment entries in accounting input records fed
to the computer. These entries are handwritten on forms provided for the
purpose.
Id.
11. Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 detail what the "adjustment entries" were. Essentially they involved changing the cash account code associated with the account
number to a margin account code, and changing the stock identification code to that
of a legitimate margin stock code. All of this was manual paperwork. Incredibly, this
was touted by the prosecutor as a computer crime, and carried as such by the media.
37. The "typical" crime involves about $6,700. GAO REPORT, supra note 14.
38. See Case of the Stolen Time, S. F. Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1978; and United Press
Int'l, Press Release A236, 01-21 04:15 PES, and A061, 01-21 05:04 RES.
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scientists in the Bay Area. First, the rate of $100 a millisecond is
almost twice the Gross National Product. Second, the ILLIAC
wasn't involved, it was a much smaller PDP-10. Third, the "computer experts" weren't--one was a terminal repairman and the
other a maintenance technician. The value later reported was
less than $2,000 and it is more likely that the amount was a few
hundred dollars. Actually the real crime was the physical theft of
electronic equipment-the thieves used the PDP-10 to inventory
their stolen goods.

Of course, there are clearly valid instances of computer crime in
the SRI collection. The Flagler Dog Track trifecta fraud being the
sharpest example (SRI Case 77322). 39 But these are few, though it
is impossible to say how many without a thorough examination of
all of the cases and a good definition of "computer crime."
The truth is, the SRI figures have no statistical validity. 4° SRI
says that they have validity only as a "lower bound" of a still largely
unexplored problem. 4 1 That is doubtful. The figures are not any
39. Details of the crime are contained in MALONEY, REPORT ON INVESTIGATING THE
"SKIMMING" AT FLAGLER DOG TRACK (1977). Flagler Dog Track in Florida used two
duplicate PDP-8 computers to compute the odds and payoffs in trifecta betting. Because the betting was fast and furious, and the computations were time-consumingeven for a computer-the dog race was often over before the computers finished their
calculations.
A confederate communicated the results of the race to the computer room, where
the computer operator threw the stop switch on one of the PDP-8s, causing the program to halt execution. At the console, the operator then "deducted" a number from
the count of losers in computer storage, and added that same number to the count of
winners, also in storage. He then restarted the computer and allowed the program to
complete its computations. Later, the gang ran the ticket printers to print up fraudulent winning tickets, which other confederates cashed the next day. Since winners
are paid from a pool formed by the losers' money, dog track officials would not detect
the loss-each true winner would get a little less than he should.
The duplicate PDP-8 was intended to prevent such frauds. The gang, however,
turned in a doctored report to track officials, and disposed of the incriminating report
produced by the untampered second computer. In the opinion of the investigators,
the crime could not have succeeded without lax auditing.
This is the only case the author has yet encountered that is indisputably a "computer" crime. It is amazing that phoney cases are touted by the proponents of S. 240,
while this real one is treated with stentorian silence.
40. SRI admits as much:
The 670 reported cases of computer abuse in our research at SRI International is not a statistical sample from which we can deduce how much crime
associated with computers there may be. It represents a biased, incomplete
collection of cases.
Testimony of Donn B. Parker before the State of California Senate Judiciary Committee regarding S.B. 66, May 1, 1979.
41. Id. ("It [the SRI cases] is merely a lower bound of incidence and loss that
shows the existence and nature of a problem but does not tell us the size or seriousness of it.")
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sort of a bound, lower or upper; rather, they are a point in a plane of
unknown coordinates, meaningless until the cases are purged and
purified. Yet, even were these figures blindly accepted, the fact remains that computer crime losses are insignificant when compared
42
to white collar crime.
Furthermore, the incidence rate of computer crime is also insignificant. Between the invention of the computer and 1975, there
43
Of
were 381 known incidents of computer "abuse" worldwide.
these cases, 77 were verified, 218 were assigned various "levels of
confidence" (i.e., probability that they actually occurred), and 86
were unverified." Some of these cases are believed to be fictitious,
and this is a very important point! Many well-known cases of computer crime, which have become part of the folklore, never occurred.
They are totally mythical, yet computer professionals, law enforcement officers, politicians, and even researchers, widely believe and
45
cite them.
Even verification has its dangers. Donn Parker, a recognized expert in the field of computer abuse, reports that two cases which
were verified turned out to be fictitious.46 In other words, the figure
of 381 "abuses," as small as it is, could very well be smaller, and
42. U. S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 25, at 5-9.
43. ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 6.
44. Id. at 10.
45. The "round-off" fraud is one example. In this fraud, the programmer accumulates the remainders after round-off in his account, instead of distributing them
among all accounts. See PARKER, supra note 11, at 114-17. If there are many accounts
over a period of time this fraud could result in a tidy sum. The possibility of fraud in
round-offs, however, was well known long before computers were used, and is so well
guarded against, that it was, and is, practically impossible to successfully perform.
Id. at 117.
Another example is the Zwana/Zzwicke story, where the programmer short
changes accounts and deposits the amounts in a false, last account. In one version of
the story-SRI Case 71319N (D. PARKER, S. NYcUm & S. OURA,COMPUTER ABUSE, app.,
at 102 (Stanford Res. Inst. Rep. 1973)), the false account was a commission account
for a fictitious salesman named Zwana. In another version of the story, the false account was for a customer named Zzwicke (reported with a straight face in Allen, Embezzler's Guide to the Computer, 53 HARv. Bus. REV., Jul.-Aug. 1975, at 87). In all
versions of the story, the fraud is discovered when the marketing department of the
company pulls the first and last names for a promotional campaign. The provenance
of the story is a second generation computer that used punched card and tape filesthat is why the false account is last.
The author strongly suspects that the MICR stories in the SRI cases (listed in
COMPUTER ABUSE, supra, app., at 91, Cases 6431N, 6432N & 6433N), and by proponents
of S.240 (see, e.g., Hearings,supra note 2, at 13 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff);
COMPUTER SECURrY STUDY, supra note 15, at 226) are also myths. There are many
such myths, too numerous to mention.
46. AsSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 12.
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must be treated with circumspection. Even accepting this figure for
the purpose of this discussion, it leads to an "abuse" incidence rate
of one case per year for every two thousand computers 47 -a very insignificant rate.
It must also be pointed out that not all of these 381 cases are
criminal in nature. They include a large number of questionable
uses of computers, as well as "odd" incidents. 48 Some do not even
involve computers. 49 Of these cases, 145 involve fraud or theft.50 A
surprising number-sixty-six 51-involve physical assaults on a computer, including four cases of a computer being shot, and one of a
woman in France who beat a CRT terminal with her high-heeled
shoe. 52 Many other cases involve only unethical, and not criminal,
conduct. A good example is that of an instructor who used his
school's computer to print fifty copies of campaign material for an
election involving school issues. 53 Others involve student shenanigans with school computers, which usually did not involve criminal
motives.
Because of loose definitions and somewhat arbitrary classifications,54 it is difficult to determine the number of real crimes out of
the 381 "abuse" cases. A good estimate is about 210 real criminal
matters. These include false entry of records, fraud and embezzlement, theft-including the theft of computer programs and the theft
of records-vandalism and sabotage. Yet, these are crimes that are
55
already adequately covered by existing state and federal laws.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., COMPUTER ABUSE, supra note 45, app., Case 6921N, at 93.
49. See, e.g., id., Cases 7021N, 7111N & 71210Y, at 95, 97 & 99.
50. ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 30 (Table 6).
51. Id.
52. PARKER, supra note 11, at 18. See also COMPUTER ABUSE, supra note 45, app.,
Cases 6811N, 8213N, at 92, 104.
53. D. PARKER, COMPUTER ABUSE PERPETRATORS AND VULNERABIITIES OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS 24 (Case 7544) (Stanford Res. Inst. Rep. 1975).

A similar case involv-

ing a student campaign is recounted id. at 21 (Case 72410).
54. "Stealing" a password is defined as theft.
55. Applicable federal laws are listed in COMPUTER SEcuRrry STUDY, supra note
15, at 210-22. There is a legal nicety involved in the theft of programs and computerized records. Generally, the theft does not involve asportation, i.e., there is no "taking" in the legal sense, since the owner is not deprived of the program by the theft.
Hearings,supra note 2, at 123 (letter from E. J. Criscuoli, Jr.). Instead, the theft involves a wrongful copying. Thus the thief cannot be charged with larceny (common
law theft), but must be charged instead with a theft of trade secrets or a copyright
violation (statutory charges). There are some who feel that the law should be modified to support common law theft charges in these cases. It is a minor issue; it makes
little difference whether the thief is punished for larceny-type theft or a trade secret
theft. See also Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuses, 5 RUTGERS J.
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There are over forty applicable laws at the federal level alone. 56 S.
240 is simply not necessary.
There are other "estimates" that should also be mentioned. One
is that only one-fifth of detected "computer" crimes are reported to
the authorities from fear of embarrassment. 57 There is no evidence
to support this contention. Furthermore, federal regulations require
financial institutions to report all crimes. 5 8 It seems unlikely that
they fail to do so, unless there has been a massive breakdown in the
enforcement of banking regulations. If there has been, a new law
will hardly cure the problem. Another estimate is that only onehundredth of all "computer" crimes are ever discovered. 59 There is
no evidence to support this estimate either.
It is claimed that the use of the computer for fraud creates a
unique sort of crime that requires it own criminal law. 60 This is
doubtful. The use of a computer to perpetrate a fraud is equivalent
to the use of an office adding maching or tub file. It is inconceivable
that a federal law is needed to cover the case of a computer operator
who, in frustration, shoots his computer, or the woman who attacks
her terminal.
There is an ancient principle that holds that the law is concerned with serious matters, not with trivia. The appropriate sanction for cases like that of the instructor who misuses the school
computer is a reprimand from his employer, or even dismissal, but
certainly not fifteen years in federal prison. The system programmer who, without authorization, plays tic-tac-toe on a computer
should be beneath notice of the law.
61
It is argued that computer crimes are difficult to prosecute.
Quite the contrary, convictions for crimes involving computers have
been easy to obtain, sometimes with federal prosecutors intruding
into the sphere of state sovereignty. In the Kelly and Palmer case in
COMPUTERS & L. 271 (1976); Nycum, Legal Problems of Computer Abuse, reprinted in
Hearings,supra note 2, at 173, 174 n.3, & 175 nn.5, 7.
56. Id. at 3, 36 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.); id. at 71, 72 (statement of
Susan H. Nycum).
57. This figure was quoted skeptically by Senator Biden. Id. at 37.
58. ASSESSMENT, supra note 19, at 26.
59. A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 4-6 (1978). This figure is attributed elsewhere to
the Commerce Department. Hearings,supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Sen. Charles
H. Percy). Bequai, adjunct professor of law at American University, is the principal
author of S. 240, along with Phil Manuel of the Senate Government Affairs Committee
staff.

60. Hearings, supra note 2, at 34-35 (statement of Joseph E. Henehan, Chief,
White Collar Crime Div., Dep't of Justice).
61. See, e.g., id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
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Philadelphia, 6 2 the defendants used their employer's computer without permission for their own outside music business. The federal
prosecutor charged them with mail fraud for advertising their music,
and the defendants were convicted. This is a clear case of unwarranted federal intrusion into a state matter.63
The United States attorney complained at the hearings on the
Ribicoff bill that the judge in United States v. Jones64 would not allow a charge of interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities-a decision which he attributed to the legal complexities
caused by computers. 65 In Jones, Michael Everston provided false
records to a Canadian corporation's computerized record system,
causing the computer to print checks payable to Everston's sister,
Amy Everston Jones, in Maryland. The prosecutor charged Jones
with interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities.
The district judge, however, ruled that the indictment was invalid
because the crime was actually forgery in a foreign country, over
which the United States has no jurisdiction. 66 The question was not
the complexities caused by computers, but one of jurisdiction: Did
the crime fall to Canadian authorities to prosecute, Maryland authorities, or federal? The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the trial judge, ruling that the checks were securities, not forgeries. 67 Jones was thereafter tried and convicted. 68 The "complexities" of this case were not due to the presence of a computer, but to
the eagerness of the prosecutor where the jurisdiction of the United
States was not immediately apparent.
This case has sparked surprising misinterpretations. A computer security professional, the same one who told the newspapers
that ILLIAC charges should be $100 per millisecond, said in a panel
discussion at the Third West Coast Computer Faire, that the district
judge ruled that the computer committed the forgery but that there
was no way to prosecute a computer. Senator Ribicoff cited this
case as one which the government "lost. '69 Perhaps the real legal
problems of computer crime are not the results of a supposed lack
62. Computer Capers, supra note 26, at 53.
63. The Seidlitz case (United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F. 2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978)), involving the theft of a computer program, is another intrusion into a state matter,
though in Seidlitz the prosecutor claimed that the local police requested federal intervention. Hearings,supra note 2, at 88 (statement of Jervis Finney).
64. 414 F. Supp. 964 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd, 553 F. 2d 351 (4th Cir. 1977).
65. CoMPUTER SEcutrry STUDY,supra note 15, at 236-38. See also Hearings,supra
note 2, at 88 (statement of Jervis Finney).
66. United States v. Jones, 414 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D. Md. 1976).
67. United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1977).
68. Hearings,supra note 2, at 88 (statement of Jervis Finney).
69. 125 CONG. REC. 711 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979). Senator Ribicoff's assertion is sur-
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of understanding of computers, but bungled indictments, improper
prosecutions, and in general, a lack of understanding of the law.
Blaming the computer is the traditional out for one's own errors.
But, even so, in every known case in which a real crime occurred,
the prosecutor has been able to secure a conviction under one or
70
more existing laws.
IX.

PRISON INMATE PROGRAMMING

The Department of Justice, and other proponents of S. 240, contend that computer crime is easy to commit and difficult to detect.
For inexplicable reasons, they regard programmers with suspicion
and hostility. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is afraid of "comand a Time magazine article on computer crime, the
puter freaks,'
obvious source of which was the Department of Justice, concluded
with the statement that "[ildeally, the first step in securing a sys'72
tem would be to shoot the programmer.
This hostility is impossible to understand. Studies of computer
crime, as flawed as they are, all agree that programmers are seldom
the perpetrators of computer crimes. The culprit is usually the data
entry clerk or manager. Yet, paradoxically, this fear and hostility towards programmers in general does not seem to apply if the programmers are armed robbers, murderers, or forgers. The
Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons currently operates a
small, but burgeoning, data processing service employing convicts in
at least six federal prisons. 7 3 Customers for these services have included the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Prisons itself, Department of
Commerce and General Services Administration.7 4 The Department
of Agriculture has even located its new computer center in Kansas
prising, coming six months after the prosecutor, testifying on the Senator's own bill,
announced with pleasure the reversal of the district judge's ruling.
70. Personal communication between John K. Taber and Donn B. Parker.
71. COMPUTER SECURrrY STUDY, supra note 15, at 243.
72. Computer Capers,supra note 26, at 53.
73. In fiscal year 1976, the prisons providing these services were Alderson, West
Virginia; Lexington, Kentucky; Miami, Florida; Terminal Island, California; Fort

Worth, Texas; and Leavenworth, Kansas.

FEDERAL PRISON INDUS., INC.

(UNICOR),

ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1978). At the present time, there are probably state prisons providing contract data processing services. Minnesota had a bill in Congress to allow
interstate commerce of prisoner written computer programs. See Hearings on Job
Training Before the House Educ. and Labor Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See
also COMPUTER SECURITY STUDY, supra note 15, at 73-123.
74. FEDERAL PRISON INDUS., INC. (UNICOR), ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1978); COMPUTER
SECURITY STUDY, supra note 15, at 84.
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City, Missouri, just to be close to the convict programmers located
in Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary.
The gross earnings from these services in fiscal year 1977 were
just under one million dollars.7 5 Data entry services are also provided for the Navy by female offenders in Alderson, West Virginia,
and Terminal Island, California.7 6 Programming is provided by
Leavenworth inmates for the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture.7 7 These programs
form part of the general ledger and accounting programs of the De78
partment of Agriculture, and affect the disbursement of funds.
The same Leavenworth inmates have reportedly written unspecified
programs for the Internal Revenue Service. 79 Indeed, there were rumors at one time, apparently unfounded, that the convicts learned
enough about the IRS computerized tax return system to enable
them to file fraudulent returns that escaped detection by the IRS. 80
Future prison data processing business can only grow, if enough
prisoners can be found who are willing and able to write programs.
The General Services Administration, no doubt at the urging of the
Department of Justice, has promulgated Federal Procurement Regulation 1-5.402.81 This regulation requires all federal agencies to give
priority to the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. over private industry
for all data entry and programming services. The affected agencies
are required to pay the current commercial rate for these services,
with perhaps a small incentive deduction.
There is clearly something wrong. On one hand, the Department of Justice is asking for broad, dangerous, statutory powers,
claiming that computer crime is so easy to commit and so difficult to
detect; on the other hand, the same agency apparently sees nothing
wrong with prisoners convicted of serious crimes programming sensitive accounting applications. Indeed, the Department is even attempting to increase such activities through federal regulation.
75. FEDERAL PRISON INDUS., INC. (UNICOR), ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1977). The areas
of data processing and printing were consolidated in the 1978 Annual Report, so it is
impossible to determine how much was earned by data processing services alone.
76. FEDERAL PRISON INDUS., INC. (UNICOR), ANIUAL REPORT 6 (1978).
77. COMPUTER SECURrrY STUDY, supra note 15, at 99-108; 123 CONG. REC. 17067
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff), reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 2, at 184.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13-14 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff); 123 CONG. REC. 17,067-68
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff), reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 2, at 184. See also COMPUTER SECURITY STUDY, supra note 15, at 76-77, 8889, 91-98 & 108-15.
81. Id. at 87.
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The truth is-there is nothing wrong with prisoners writing programs. Computer crime is not easy to commit, and the Bureau of
Prisons' program is living proof. This is the one good, job training
program in the entire federal prison system. Qualified convicts are
learning a useful trade, unlike the usual prison jobs, and are quickly
hired on release for meaningful, well-paid jobs. As one would ex82
pect, the recidivism rate for convict programmers is extremely low.
The "bottom line" is that the Department of Justice is pursuing a
schizophrenic course in supporting the Ribicoff bill.

III. THis BILL OUTLAws COMMON PRACTICES
Section (b) of the bill is simply too broad. It fails, and in fact
does not even attempt, to distinguish between felonious uses of
computers, lesser criminal uses of computers, and ethically questionable or simple unauthorized uses. This failure threatens to
make criminals out of a large portion of the computer profession.
"Unauthorized" use of computers is widespread among programmers. 8 3 Programmers on occasion use their employer's computer to play games like tic-tac-toe or Star Trek. They draw tabby
cat calendars and pin-up girls. They have discovered that by using
certain combinations of nonsense character combinations on IBM
1403 printers they can generate musical tones; there is at least one
programmer who can play "She'll Be Comin' Round the Mountain"
on the printer, with judiciously timed page ejects as a drum beat accompaniment.
Programmers' ingenuity is amazing. They use the computer to
balance their checkbooks, chart the misfortunes of their stocks, and
figure mortgage tables. They write "unauthorized" programs, out of
curiosity, that have little earthly use, like the knight's tour of the
chessboard, or a base-256 multiplier. Sometimes an "unauthorized"
program proves useful and, through the programmers' "grapevine,"
becomes unofficially adopted at computer centers throughout the
world. This play and incidental personal use is without pecuniary
motive. Yet, all of it would be a federal offense under Section (b) of
the Ribicoff bill.
There are some who argue that such play should be forbidden;
that the computer is not a toy, but a very expensive asset; and, that
such games steal time and resources from their rightful owners.
This argument has merit, but S. 240 is a radical solution to the problem-if it is a problem. Imprisonment for fifteen years is a sanction
82. Hearings, supra note 2, at 63 (statement of Donn B. Parker); COMPUTER SEcurry STUDY, supra note 15, at 77-78.
83. Id. at 54 & 68.
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totally out of proportion to the "offense." The bill is an improper intrusion into an area where there is no legitimate public policy interest. Employment sanctions have been, and should continue to be,
the adequate and proper remedy.
Employer's views on "unauthorized" uses vary widely. Some
flatly forbid any non-business uses of their computers, and police
machine usage to enforce the ban. Others forbid the practice in theory, but allow it in practice, and even "wink" at it. Still others permit it as a fringe benefit of employment.8 4 For many companies,
such use has never been considered a "problem" that needed to be
addressed.8 5 Thus, an act committed on one computer might be perfectly legal, and even win the programmer a commendation, while
the same act, performed on the same computer in another location,
could cause his imprisonment. S. 240 could never be equitably enforced.
Great care must be exercised in forbidding such uses. Eliza, for
example, can be considered a "game," yet is a classic in artificial intelligence research. Many "games," in fact, provide great insight
into computer programming and are of professional benefit. In
many areas of science, mathematics, and computer science it is impossible to distinguish between "unauthorized" uses and legitimate
research. Researchers will find this bill an intolerable infringement
on their creative freedom.
S. 240 does not address the problem of who may authorize what
uses of the computer. Presumably, the authorizer is the employer.
Yet, this leads to the absurd conclusion that the Equity Funding
fraud would not have violated section (b), since the officers of the
company authorized use of the computer in perpetrating the fraud.
Who may authorize what use is not an idle question. "Employers" are often simply users of computer equipment, and own neither
the hardware nor the software. The owner-lessor does not relinquish his rights by renting these items to the user. Yet, it is common practice for the user to alter rented code, and even hardware,
without express authorizaton from the owner. Section (b), which
makes unauthorized alteration of computer programs a felony, will
84. Id. at 80 (statement of Robert P. Abbott).
85. Id. at 54 (statement of Donn B. Parker). IBM prohibits non-business uses of
their computers, and conducts internal audits to ensure compliance. If Hewlett-Packard has a similar ban, their programmers are unaware of it. Many smaller firms, too
numerous to mention, allow non-business uses as a fringe benefit. An example of an
unofficial program is DEBE (Does Everything But Eat). It is a useful utility program, written without specific authorization, and in use wherever there are IBM computers. There are many other programs like DEBE. See also id. at 150-51 (statement
of Peter S. Browne).
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force wholesale renegotiations of software, and to a lesser extent
hardware, leasing contracts. There is no compelling reason to
change this common industry-wide practice.
IV.

THE BILL MAKES FELONIES OUT OF ABSURDITIES

The definition of a "computer" contained in S. 240 is too broad:
"'[cJomputer' means an electronic device which performs logical,
arithmetic, and memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or magnetic impulses .... *"86 This definition would include,
and is apparently meant to include, pocket calculators, and even
some digital watches. 87 Microprocessors enjoy wide application today in all sorts of gadgets. Under this bill, a secretary who uses an
automatic typewriter to type a personal letter, or the office worker
who uses his company's calculator to balance his checkbook, is a
felon. It is doubtful that this definitional problem can be overcome,
since the industry itself has never been able to agree on a generally
accepted definition of "computer" for technical purposes, let alone
legal. s8
V. THE BILL MAY BE ABUSED
This bill has a dangerous potential for abuse. First, it is a seri86. S. 240, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1979).
87. When it was pointed out to the staff members of the Government Affairs
Committee, who helped draft this bill, that their definition of computer included trivia
like pocket calculators, they indicated that they meant to do so. They posited a bizarre illustration of a mortgage applicant tampering with a bank officer's calculator to
make the payments fraudulently benefit the applicant. Private communication between John K. Taber and Donn B. Parker. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 67
(statement of Donn B. Parker).
88. Donn Parker attempted to get several computer scientists to define "computer" for California Senate Bill S.B. 66, State Senator Lou Cusanovich's "little
Ribicoff bill," introduced in December 1978. The text of the current version of S.B. 66
is set forth in the Appendix to this article. Agreement, however, has been difficult to
achieve. The problem is to exclude trivia like calculators at one end of the scale, and
the telephone system, which is the largest special purpose computer ever built, at the
other. The purpose of such an exercise is to limit the definition of "computer" to a
general purpose digital computer used for record keeping. Eventually, Parker did get
a definition, which had to be rejected for being too complex and technical for a lay
jury to understand. Private communications between John K. Taber and Charles
Mobley, Senator Cusanovich's staff consultant. See also Gruenberger, What's in a
Name?, 25 DATAMATION, May 1979, at 230:

It is discouraging we can't, as a profession, get simple things like definitions
straight. Perhaps we will never be able to fabricate a decent definition of a
term like "systems analyst," but we ought to be able to pinpoint a term like
"computer." If we don't, then some ill-informed judge will pinpoint them for
us, and we won't like the outcome.
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ous threat to privacy. Second, there is an obvious danger of imprisoning programmers and other computer users for mere bagatelles.
From society's point of view, record-keeping is the most important use of computers today. Most record-keeping is computerized,
and virtually all records soon will be. This bill, since it is so broad,
gives the FBI, under its investigative powers, a right of access to
records to which it never before had access. This point was made by
Senator Biden at the hearings on S. 240:
I know that there is a good deal of criticism and concern about
abuse of power by [the FBI, the CIA, and our security industry].
We are going to be turning to these agencies and saying "We
are going to broaden your jurisdiction now. We are going to allow
you legally to get into a number of data banks that you did not have
access to before." * * * [Y]our legislation is very broad. As I read
it, just about any computer in America will be accessible for the
first time
to investigation by a major Federal law enforcement
89
agency.
The point is undeniable, and Senator Charles Percy, to whom
Senator Biden addressed these remarks, did not deny it. 90 Senator
Percy allowed that S. 240 was not a panacea 9 and, when Biden
pressed the point, Percy expressed pious hopes that a privacy bill,
92
"vitally needed" but not yet enacted, would help prevent abuses.
The second potential abuse is the arbitrary jailing of programmers for slight indiscretions. As has already been noted, 93 "unauthorized" use of computers is widespread. The bill will not change
that fact. Most programmers and other users will remain unaware
of the law. Further, whether or not correct, programmers do not feel
that their personal use of computers is wrong, as long as it is not for
material gain.
Third, even if some become aware of the law, they will not believe that it applies to their "unauthorized" use of computers. Generally speaking, computer professionals are technically-oriented and
do not know or care about laws. The result will be that most programmers and other computer users will be unprosecuted felons,
vulnerable to the charging abuses of overzealous prosecutors.9
This bill gives too much discretionary power to law enforcement
89. Hearings,supra note 2, at 24-25 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.).
90. Id. at 25.
91. "I am not saying this is a panacea, but this is the quickest way. We do not
want to make it a complicated bill." Id.
92. Id. Nor did Senator Ribicoff, the Department of Justice or the FBI deny the
point.
93. See note 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
94. Hearings,supra note 2, at 68 (statement of Donn B. Parker).
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officers. While some discretion is necessary for effective law enforcement, modern American history does not make happy reading
in the enforcement of broad statutes. The FBI has abused its powers; it has acted illegally in searches and seizures. Why encourage
further abuses?
Would this law be abused? The Department of Justice says that
it would prosecute only those cases in which the federal government
has a "compelling interest."9 5 This is cold comfort. It means that if
a programmer is jailed for playing computer tic-tac-toe, it must be
presumed that the government had a compelling interest. Nowhere
does either the FBI or the Department of Justice explicitly promise
not to prosecute a programmer who plays tic-tac-toe or draws a calendar, even under direct questioning on the point:
BIDEN: * * * Let us level with the public. Let us acknowledge to
them, by implication at least, that we are not going to prosecute
that particular person....
FINNEY (Department of Justice): The Snoopy [calendar] was our
case.
BIDEN: Yes. Acknowledge that we are not going to prosecute
Snoopy and do not leave the possibility of abuse, which does exist
96

now.

Finney's response covers several pages, mentions the good
sense of the FBI and the Department of Justice, and claims that
trust is needed.9 7 Yet, nowhere does he give the acknowledgement
requested. He purposefully avoids committing the Department of
Justice not to prosecute such activities.
Will computer users be jailed for these trifles? The probability
is grim. Past performance is one indication, but even more important is impetus. Computer crime does not exist; it is a misnomer applied to several crimes that may or may not involve computersgenerally, record-keeping crimes. But it is a new, glamorous crime
sensationalized by the media. Even Dick Tracy is fighting computer
95. Id. at 36 (statement of John C. Kenney, Deputy Ass't Atty. Gen., Crim. Div.,
Dep't of Justice).
96. Id. at 91 (statement of Jervis Finney). The choice of Snoopy calendars as the
generic example for this type of "playing around" is due to Donn Parker of SRI, and
is poorly chosen. Years ago, Charles Schulz' attorneys requested that the industry
stop the making of Snoopy calendars, because the practice infringed on Mr. Schulz'
copyrights. Management agreed, and suppressed the practice. The author has not
personally seen an illicit Snoopy calendar since about 1970. All participants in discussions on the computer crime bill should refrain from using this example so as to
avoid unnecessarily alarming Mr. Schulz. If a generic term is needed, such items as
tic-tac-toe, or the contemporary rage "Adventure," written by computer scientists at
MIT and Stanford's artificial intelligence laboratory, could be used.
97. Id.
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crime. 98 Computer crime suffers from great publicity, which in turn
creates the impression that it is a widespread problem. This publicity generates political pressure for the prosecution of computer
crimes. Unfortunately, there are scarcely any such crimes, except
the playing of tic-tac-toe. The prosecutor, trained for and assigned
to prosecute computer crime, will have to be content with prosecuting this "criminal" plague if he expects to advance his career.
The reader may think it unlikely that a judge would permit
prosecution of this type of activity. Unfortunately, a judge will have
little choice. Senator Ribicoff, on reintroducing this legislation as S.
240, said that this type of "playing around" is the same type of activity that encourages computer crimes.99 He cites as an example a
Department of Agriculture employee at the Washington Computer
Center who permitted his children to play games on the Department's computer. There is scarcely a programmer in the country
who has not done the same. But the same employee also used the
WCC computer for his own outside consulting business. The drift of
Senator Ribicoff's contention is that the main purpose of the bill is
not to jail programmers for "playing around," but that to change the
language of the bill to accommodate "playing around" would seri98. Dick Tracy seems to be out-and-out Department of Justice propaganda. Richard L. Thornburgh, Assistant Attorney General said in 1976:
Computer users are curiously ambivalent about security. Consider the business man who would never leave his checkbook lying on top of his desk...
This same business man will purchase a multimillion dollar computer ...
without an audit as basic as a cancelled check-will place a computer terminal on the top of the desk unattended.
COMPUTER SECURITY STUDY, supra note 15, at 228. And this from Dick Tracy, Jan. 28,

1979:
DETECTIVE SAM: Sir, do you leave your billfold out on your desk, when
you go to lunch?
WALTER PREMIUM (Business man, president of Equity America Life,
whose computer is a "$1,000,000 loss" due to a shotgun fired in its chips, "not
just the computer, but data too"): What? Certainly not!
DETECTIVE SAM: Well, doesn't a multi-million dollar computer complex
deserve as much consideration as a billfold? During the lunch hour here,
only a secretary and a computer programmer stood between a MANIAC and
your elaborate computer system.
Thornburgh, by the way, is now governor of Pennsylvania.
99. 125 CONG. REC. 719 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979). Throughout this lengthy debate
Ribicoff stressed government computers, over which Congress, as an employer, may
be presumed to have a rightful interest in their use for non-business purposes. Only
at the end, in one brief clause, does he mention computers of "certain organizations
involved in interstate commerce." Id. at 720. The impression created by his emphasis
on federal computers is disingenuous. Senator Ribicoff is certainly aware that the bill
covers computers of "entities affecting interstate commerce," meaning virtually all
computers in the private sector, not just "certain" interstate organizations.
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ously weaken it. If an innocent programmer runs afoul of the language, too bad; he should not be "playing around" anyway.
This is not just a Senator's overzealous advocacy. Trial judges,
when attempting to apply new law in a doubtful case, consult the
legislative record to determine the law's intent. Unless there are
constitutional grounds, the judge is required to respect that intent.
The Constitution does not forbid bad laws, only certain bad laws.
Senator Ribicoffs comments were clearly an expression of legislative intent. If S. 240 becomes law, judges will feel compelled to permit trial of the tic-tac-toe'er, limiting the scope of trial to a factual
determination of whether or not the tic-tac-toe player intentionally
played without authorization. Though the programmer may not receive a stiff sentence, even the judge's discretion in this area may be
seriously circumscribed. Senate Bill S. 1437100 may soon become
law. This bill limits the judge's sentencing discretion to a formula of
plus or minus twenty-five percent. Under that law, a programmer's
sentence would have to be between eleven years and nineteen
10 1
years.
For sometime now, the FBI has been training prosecutors and
other law enforcement personnel on computer crime. The FBI conducts both a one week course and a four week course at Quantico,
Virginia. The one week course has had over five hundred graduates.
Mr. Henehan of the FBI said in testimony that " . . . there is a reluctance on the part of both the prosecutors and the investigators to
get into these cases [that is, computer crime]. We find that through
training they are much more anxious to accept a case." 10 2 This
course apparently generates enthusiasm for prosecuting computer
crimes.
The FBI also thinks that it will need two hundred more special
agents, forty-five more accountant technicians, and ten auditor-computer specialists to fight computer crime. 10 3 What this means is that
a large number of people are being trained to prosecute and investigate computer crimes. While this is a glamorous new area, there is
currently little to do except prosecute programmers playing tic-tactoe.
The chances for abuses from this legislation are enormous. The
only protection to the public is the promise of the FBI and Department of Justice that we can trust their good sense.
100. Hearings,supra note 2, at 48-49 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.)
101. Id.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. at 110 (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Ass't Atty. Gen., Crim. Div.,
Dep't of Justice).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Senate bill S. 240 is an ill-drafted and dangerous law that must
be rejected. Minor flaws could be corrected, but the bill is fundamentally and fatally flawed. For example, one minor flaw is the in4
correct use of the noun "access" as a verb for no apparent reason.10
This usage is computer jargon that Congress should not enshrine in
the United States Code. Section (a), which duplicates existing
fraud laws, 10 5 should also be eliminated as unnecessary.
The fundamental flaw, however, is that the bill defines an abstraction-"computer crime"-as a crime, rather than proscribing
specific acts. The phrase "computer crime" (or "filing cabinet
crime") beclouds specific criminal acts, and non-criminal acts, with
a trope drawn from the instrumentality of the acts. While it is true
that one may commit murder with a filing cabinet by dropping it on
the victim, and one may tamper with records by using a computer,
nevertheless, the crimes are murder and fraud, not unauthorized
06
use of a filing cabinet or unauthorized access to a computer.
S. 240 is a bad bill, a dangerous bill, and should be opposed.

104. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c)(1) (1979).
105. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1976).
106. A computer is just a technique or method by which people are doing the
same types of things that have been done in the past-embezzlement, thefts
from their employers, and so forth. The computer merely gives certain people with knowledge and access an increased opportunity to do this sort of
thing and in some situations the opportunity to do it in a greater way than it
would be possible with the normal embezzlement and other criminal techniques.
Hearings,supra note 2, at 43 (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Ass't Atty. Gen.,
Crim. Div., Dep't of Justice).
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APPENDIX
96TH

1ST

CONGRESS
SESSION

S.240

To amend title 18, United States Code, to make a crime the use, for
fraudulent or other illegal purposes, of any computer owned or
operated by the United States, certain financial institutions, and
entities affecting interstate commerce.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY

25 (legislative day, JANUARY 15), 1979

MR. RmIcoFF (for himself, Mr. PERCY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. INOUYE, Mr.
JACKSON, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr.
ZORmNSKY, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. CHILES, and Mr.

NUNN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL
To amend title 18, United States Code, to make a crime the use, for
fraudulent or other illegal purposes, of any computer owned or
operated by the United States, certain financial institutions, and
entities affecting interstate commerce.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Federal Computer Systems Protection
Act of 1979".
SEC. 2. The Congress finds that(1) computer-related crime is a growing problem in the
Government and in the private sector;
(2) such crime occurs at great cost to the public since
losses for each incident of computer crime tend to be far greater
than the losses associated with each incident of other white collar crime;
(3) the opportunities for computer-related crimes in Federal programs, in financial institutions, and in other entities
which operate in interstate commerce through the introduction

1979]

ON COMPUTER CRIME

of fraudulent records into a computer system, unauthorized use
of computer facilities, alteration or destruction of computerized
information files, and stealing of financial instruments, data, or
other assets, are great;
(4) computer-related crime directed at institutions operating in interstate commerce has a direct effect on interstate commerce; and
(5) the prosecution of persons engaged in computer-related
crime is difficult under current Federal criminal statutes.
SEc. 3.(a) Chapter 47 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"§1028.

Computer fraud and abuse

"(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly accesses, causes to be accessed or attempts to access any computer,
computer system, computer network, or any part thereof which, in
whole or in part, operates in interstate commerce or is owned by,
under contract to, or in conjunction with, any financial institution,
the United States Government or any branch, department, or
agency thereof, or any entity operating in or affecting interstate
commerce, for the purpose of"(1) devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
"(2) obtaining money, property, or services, for themselves
or another, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, shall be fined a sum not more than two and
one-half times the amount of the fraud or theft, or imprisoned
not more than fifteen years, or both.
"(b) Whoever intentionally and without authorization, directly
or indirectly accesses, alters, damages, destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy any computer, computer system, or computer network described in subsection (a), or any computer software,
program or data contained in such computer, computer system or
computer network, shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.
"(c) For purposes of this section, the term"(1) 'access' means to approach, instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of
any resources of, a computer, computer system, or computer
network;
"(2) 'computer' means an electronic device which performs
logical, arithmetic, and memory functions by the manipulation
of electronic or magnetic impulses, and includes all input, out-
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put, processing, storage, software, or communication facilities
which are connected or related to such a device in a system or
network.
"(3) 'computer system' means a set of related, connected or
unconnected, computer equipment, devices, and software;
"(4) 'computer network' means the interconnection of communication systems with a computer through remote terminals,
or a complex consisting of two or more interconnected computers;
"(5) 'property' includes, but is not limited to, financial instruments, information, including electronically processed or
produced data, and computer software and programs in either
machine or human readable form, and any other tangible or intangible item of value;
"(6) 'services' includes, but is not limited to, computer
time, data processing, and storage functions;
"(7) 'financial instrument' means any check, draft, money
order, certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange,
credit card, or marketable security, or any electronic data
processing representation thereof;
"(8) 'computer program' means an instruction or statement
or a series of instructions or statements, in a form acceptable to
a computer, which permits the functioning of a computer system in a manner designed to provide appropriate products from
such computer system;
"(9) 'computer software' means a set of computer programs, procedures, and associated documentation concerned
with the operation of a computer system;
"(10) 'financial institution' means"(A) a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
"(B) a member of the Federal Reserve including any
Federal Reserve bank,
"(C) an institution with accounts insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation;
"(D) a credit union with accounts insured by the National Credit Union Administration;
"(E) a member of the Federal home loan bank systems
and any home loan bank,
"(F) a member or business insured by the Securities
Investor Protection Corporation; and
"(G) a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and
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Exchange Commission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934".
(c) The table of sections of chapter 47 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
"1028.

Computer fraud and abuse.".

AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 19, 1979
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 17, 1979
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 9, 1979
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 23, 1979
AMENDED IN SENATE FEBRUARY 15, 1979

No. 66

SENATE BILL
Introduced by Senator Cusanovich
December 5, 1978

An act to add Section 502 to the Penal Code, relating to computer crime.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 66, as amended, Cusanovich. Computer crime.
Existing law relative to crimes involving fraud, or unauthorized
access to, or damage or destruction of, property does not contain
any specific provision relative to computers.
This bill would make it a crime, as specified, to intentionally access or cause to be accessed any computer system, or computer network for the purpose of (1) devising or executing any scheme or
artifice to defraud or extort or (2) obtaining money, property or
services with false or fraudulent intent, representations, or
promises; or to maliciously access, alter, delete, damage, or destroy
any computer system, computer network, computer program, or
data.
Under existing law, Sections 2231 and 2234 of the Revenue and
Taxation Code require the state to reimburse local agencies and
school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Other provisions require the Department of Finance to review statutes disclaiming these costs and provide, in certain cases, for making claims
to the State Board of Control for reimbursement.
This bill provides that no appropriation is made by this act pur-
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suant to Section 2231 and 2234 for a specified reason, but recognizes
that local agencies and school districts may pursue their other available remedies to seek reimbursement for these costs.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program. yes.
The people of the State of Californiado enact asfollows.
SECTION 1. Section 502 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
502. (a) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Access" means to instruct, communicate with, store data
in, or retrieve data from a computer system or computer network.
(2) "Computer system" means a machine or collection of ma.ntal,
du.atinal, -r c-mmcreial purp.,
chines, used fer g.v mc
one or more of which contain computer programs and data, that performs functions, including, but not limited to, logic, arithmetic, data
storage and retrieval, communication, and control.
(3) "Computer network" means an interconnection of two or
more computer systems.
(4) "Computer program" means an ordered set of instructions
or statements, and related data that, when automatically executed
in actual or modified form in a computer system, causes it to perform specified functions.
(5) "Data" means a representation of information, knowledge,
facts, concepts, or instructions, which are being prepared or have
been prepared, in a formalized manner, and are intended for use in
a computer system or computer network.
(6) "Financial instrument" includes, but is not limited to, any
check, draft, warrant, money order, note, certificate of deposit, letter
of credit, bill of exchange, credit or debit card, transaction authorization mechanism, marketable security, or any computer system representation thereof.
(7) "Property" includes, but is not limited to, financial instruments, data, computer programs, documents associated with computer systems and computer programs, or copies thereof, whether
tangible or intangible, including both human and computer system
readable data, and data while in transit.
(8) "Services" includes, but is not limited to, the use of the
computer system, computer network, computer programs, or data
prepared for computer use, or data contained within a computer system, or data contained within a computer network.
(b) Any person who intentionally accesses or causes to be accessed any computer system or computer network for the purpose
of (1) devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or ex-
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tort or (2) obtaining money, property, or services with false or fraudulent intent, representations, or promises shall be guilty of a public
offense.
(c) Any person who maliciously accesses, alters, deletes, damages, or destroys any computer system, computer network, computer program, or data shall be guilty of a public offense.
(d) Any person who violates the provisions of subdivision (b)
or (c) is guilty of a felony and is punishable by a fine not exceeding
five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state
prison for 16 months, or two or three years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(e) This section shall not be construed to preclude the applicability of any other provision of the criminal law of this state which
applies or may apply to any transaction.
SEC. 2. Notwithstanding Section 2231 or 2234 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code, no appropriation is made by this act pursuant to
these sections because this act creates a new crime or infraction,
eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty for a crime
or infraction. It is recognized, however, that a local agency or school
district may pursue any remedies to obtain reimbursement available
to it under Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 2201) of Part 4 of
Division 1 of that code.

